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Abstract 
The process of diagnosis involves learning about 
the state of a system from various observations of 
symptoms or findings about the system. 
Sophisticated Bayesian (and other) algorithms 
have been developed to revise and maintain 
beliefs about the system as observations are 
made. Nonetheless, diagnostic models have 
tended to ignore some common sense reasoning 
exploited by human diagnosticians. In particular, 
one can learn from which observations have not 
been made, in the spirit of conversational 
implicature. 
In order to e·xtract information from the 
observations not made, we propose the following 
two concepts. First, some symptoms, if present, 
are more likely to be reported before others. 
Second, most human diagnosticians and expert 
systems are economical in their data-gathering, 
searching first where they are more likely to find 
symptoms present. Thus, there is a desirable bias 
toward reporting symptoms that are present. We 
develop a simple model for these concepts that 
can significantly improve diagnostic inference. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
''Is there any point to which you would wish to 
draw my attention?" 
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night­
time." 
"The dog did nothing in the night-time." 
"That was the curious incident," remarked 
Sherlock Holmes. 
- from Silver Blaze by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
This paper argues that the current practice for modeling 
missing observations in interactive Bayesian expert 
systems is incorrect. If there is no reported value for a 
chance node in a belief network, it is usually assumed that 
that chance node is unobserved and that this unobserved 
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node contributes no likelihood information to the rest of 
the belief network. If this chance node has no graphical 
successors, then it is barren [Shachter, 86]: the joint 
distribution of the other variables in the belief network is 
not a function of the distribution of the unobserved node. 
In interactive diagnostic expert systems, however, there is 
a systematic bias introduced by people's preferences for 
reporting that can lead to systematic errors in diagnosis. In 
medicine, common sources of reporting biases might 
include: 
a bias to report symptoms that are present instead of 
symptoms that are absent, or 
a bias to report symptoms that are more significant or 
urgent instead of symptoms that are less obviously urgent. 
Failure to model these biases can lead an expert system to 
produce erroneous recommendations early in the 
diagnostic process. If these biases are explicitly modeled, 
we demonstrate that early diagnostic differentials are more 
focussed, leading to more focussed question asking. 
Furthermore, the observations that the user of the expert 
system chooses to reveal inform on the likelihoods of 
unobserved variables. 
The primary objective of this paper is to describe a simple 
mechanism for modeling biases in the responses to open 
probe questions in diagnostic expert systems. Open probe 
questions are unstructured questions that give the user 
freedom to choose the order that information is revealed. 
Section 2 describes open and closed probe questions and 
demonstrates that the responses to open probe questions 
do influence the probabilities of unobserved symptoms in 
diagnostic belief nets. Section 3 introduces the report 
node-a mechanism for modeling open probe questions in 
diagnostic domains comprised of unrelated symptoms of 
comparable severity. Section 4 shows how the simple 
report mechanism can be modified to allow the expert 
system to infer a particular user's biases from their 
responses to open probe questions. Section 5 introduce� a 
technique for handling symptoms that vary in perceived 
severity. Finally, Section 6 relates the report mechanism 
to concepts in linguistics, specifically conversational 
implicature and scalar implicature. 
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2 OPEN AND CLOSED PROBES 
Questions in a diagnosis domain can be grouped into two 
general categories, open and closed probes. Closed probes 
are requests for specific items of information. Examples of 
closed probes include: "Is the patient male or female?" Or 
"Is the patient running a fever?" Closed probes tend to 
discourage the user of the expert system from volunteering 
more than just the requested information. An open probe is 
a more general request for information that allows the user 
to select from a plethora of possible responses. Examples 
of open probes might include: "What brings you to the 
doctor today?" or "What looks abnormal on the patient's 
CT scan?'' 
Open probe questions are more informative than closed 
probe questions even if the same observations are made. 
For example, suppose that a doctor starts a patient 
interview with the closed probe question: "Do you have a 
rash?" The response to this question ("Yes" or "No") will 
lead the doctor to adjust the probabilities of diseases that 
are conditionally relevant to the observation. The response 
will have no effect on the belief inferred for other diseases. 
Say instead that the doctor starts the interview with the 
open probe question: "What is bothering you today?" The 
patient responds, "I have a rash." In this case, the doctor 
can conclude far more. In addition to the fact 
"Rash = true", the doctor might also reduce her belief that 
competing symptoms are present, especially if those 
symptoms are more severe. For example, the doctor might 
infer that it is unlikely that the patient is presenting with a 
severe headache or clenching chest pain; because if the 
patient were experiencing those symptoms, the patient 
would have mentioned them. This, in turn, decreases the 
probability that a non-rash-related disorder is present; 
focussing the doctor's subsequent question asking only on 
rash-related diseases. 
Bayesian expert systems do not properly model the open 
probe phase of the patient interview process. In order to 
see why, we will consider the simple diagnostic belief 
network illustrated in Figure I. In this figure, there are 4 
binary chance nodes representing two competing diseases, 
Poison Ivy (PI) and Migraine (M), with their associated 
symptoms, Rash (R) and Headache (H). Each of these 
nodes is binary with values absent and present. Poison ivy 
causes rash and migraine causes headache. 
Figure 1: A simple diagnostic belief network. The 
shading on R denotes that the value for R is observed. 
Suppose that we ask the patient a closed probe question 
about the presence of a rash. If the patient responds "Yes:' 
we set the value of "Rash" in the belief network to 
"present." Based on this single observation, we conclude 
that the probability that poison ivy is present will change, 
while the probability that a migraine is present will be 
unchanged. 
Figure 2: A belief network modeling a patient's response 
to an open probe question. 
Now imagine that we ask the open probe question: "What 
is your problem?" If the patient responds that he has a rash 
and says nothing at all about the presence or absence of a 
headache, then we argue that the probability we should 
assign to headache (and migraine) should be reduced (or at 
least change). 
The patient's response to the open probe question is a 
function of all of the symptoms si that he is experiencing 
at the time that the question is asked as well as the history 
of interaction between the patient and the diagnostician 
and other external factors. This situation is illustrated in 
Figure 2. Response is a chance node that represents the 
patient's response to the open probe question. Response is 
a function of the presence or absence of each of the 
symptoms as well as the possibly-observable external 
factors node. The values for the Response variable include 
all of the possible responses that the patient might make 
when answering the open probe. Possibilities in this 
instance might include "I have a headache," or "I have a 
headache and a rash," "I hate it when you ask me all of 
these annoying questions," etc. 
Because the patient's response to the open probe is a 
function of all of the symptoms that might influence the 
patient's chosen utterance, the response to the open probe 
should change our belief concerning every symptom that 
can influence the response. In this instance, we would 
argue that the patient would have a relatively high 
probability of reporting a severe headache if one were 
present. Since the patient did not choose to report any 
information about a headache, we can conclude that the 
patient probably does not have one. 
2.1 THE IMPACT OF OPEN PROBE QUESTIONS 
ON EXPERT SYSTEMS 
How does this problem manifest in a diagnostic expert 
system? 
The architecture of a typical diagnostic expert system is 
illustrated in Figure 3. This expert system is based on the 
hypothetico-deductive (H-D) cycle [Gorry+Barnett, 68; 
Miller, et al, 82; Horvitz, et al, 84]. In the H-D cycle, the 
user initiates diagnosis by presenting a (possibly empty) 
set of salient observations to the expert system. These 
observations are fed into the expert system based on the 
implicit open probe, "What features describe your 
problem?" Based on these salient observations, the expert 
system computes a probability distribution P(D;) (called a 
differential diagnosis) over the possible fault or disease 
hypotheses D;. After observing the initial differential 
diagnosis, the user can elect to act on this diagnosis or to 
refine the differential by answering further questions. In an 
expert system tool like Knowledge Industries' WIN-DX or 
Microsoft's MSBN system, some form of information 
value analysis [Howard 66; 67] is used to select the best 
observations to narrow the differential diagnosis. After the 
user answers one or more of these questions, the expert 
system formulates a new differential diagnosis and the 
cycle repeats. 
Salient Observations 
Observe 
Treat or Repair 
Figure 3: The H-D Cycle 
In our example, the patient might enter the observation 
Rash = present in order to seed the diagnostic process. In 
the typical Bayesian expert system, a closed probe model 
(Fig. 1) is used to evaluate the response to the open probe 
question (Fig. 2). As a result, the expert system will over 
estimate the probability of symptoms the diseases that 
compete with poison ivy (e.g. migraine). This, in turn, 
causes the expert system to ask seemingly irrelevant 
questions in order to rule out competing diseases, even 
though no evidence has been presented that would lead the 
expert system to suspect that these diseases were present. 
3 BASIC REPORT NODES 
If we were really clever (Turing Award clever), we could 
assess the outcomes and probability distribution for the 
Response variable in Figure 2. We (unfortunately) are 
significantly less clever, so we propose just to roughly 
model the likelihood and independence properties of the 
portions of the belief network surrounding Response. 
Figure 4 illustrates the likelihoods resulting from 
observing Response to be "rash." The report node 
mechanism (to be defined) is based on the following two 
assumptions about these likelihoods: 
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1. Veridicality: The user's response corresponds to the 
facts; that is, if the responder says that they have 
symptom S, then symptom S is present with probabil­
ity 1.0. This assumption allows us to assume that A.+ 
(See Fig 4) is the same whether node Rash is observed 
directly or not. 
2. Likelihood Independence: The likelihoods A.-(S) for 
symptoms that are not mentioned are mutually inde­
pendent.1 
Figure 4: Likelihood feedback from Response. 
Given these assumptions, we can derive a simpler network 
model (Figure 5) that has the same independence and 
likelihood properties as the network of Figure 4. We 
replace the Response node with a series of binary report 
nodes, ReportQ(S;); one for each symptom S; that is a 
predecessor of the old Response variable. 
Figure 5: Approximating the response likelihood using 
Report. 
The report node ReportQ(S;) represents the event: "A value 
is reported for symptom S; in response to an open probe 
question Q." ReportQ(S;) is true if any value is observed 
for S; and is false otherwise. 
Note that if all of the symptom nodes were to be observed 
that the report nodes become independent from the 
remainder of the network. The report node mechanism is 
designed to capture the reporting biases for symptoms 
immediately after an open probe question is answered. 
Subsequent closed probe questioning on these unobserved 
symptoms will "wash away" the effect of the report nodes 
1 We will relax this assumption in the next section. 
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on those symptoms, D-separating [Geiger, et al; 90] the 
report nodes from the rest of the network. 
3.1 ASSESSMENT: REPORTABILITY AND 
REPORTING BIAS 
The probability distribution for ReportQ(S;) can be 
assessed directly. We have found it useful, however, to 
factor the assessment. First we aggregate symptom values 
into two categories: present and absent. For each 
symptom, we assess P{ReportQ(Si) I Si =present}, the 
probability that the symptom will be reported given that it 
is abnormal. We will call this probability the reportability 
of the symptom, P Q(Si). Symptoms that are more 
evocative will tend to have a higher reportability. Subtle 
symptoms will tend to have a lower reportability. 
The second parameter that we assess is the reporting bias 
for the symptom. This is the likelihood ratio 
P{ReportQ(S;} IS;= present} 
BQ(S;) P{ReportQ(S;} iS;- absent} 
The reporting bias captures the fact that people are more 
likely to report the presence of a symptom rather than the 
absence of that symptom (recall the quotation at the start 
of the paper). If the reporting bias is greater than or equal 
to 1, the reportability and reporting bias together specify a 
single unique conditional probability distribution for the 
report node. 
In order to minimize the number of parameters that have to 
be assessed for a model, we can assume that the reporting 
bias is constant for all symptoms in the knowledge base. 
With this assumption, we only need to assess one 
parameter, reportability, for each symptom in the 
knowledge base. We can reduce the burden of assessment 
still further by assessing reportability for groups of 
symptoms rather than the individual symptoms 
themselves. 
Example: Suppose that an expert system for dermatology 
proceeds sequentially through the following two phases of 
question-asking: 
1. Open probe (Initial complaint) phase: The user 
selects any number of symptoms from a menu of 
complaints, pressing OK when done. 
2. Closed probe phase: The diagnosis system uses infor­
mation value analysis to select subsequent questions 
for the user to answer. 
Our task is to assess a distribution for Report1nu(Rash). 
Rash can be either a bumpy blue rash, an itchy red rash, or 
absent. In this case, the two types of rash are considered to 
have roughly the same reportability. The knowledge 
engineer feels that it is highly likely that the patient will 
report either of these rashes and assigns them a 
reportability of 0.95. The knowledge engineer had 
previously assigned a reporting bias of 5 to the entire 
knowledge base, indicating that the patient is 5 times more 
likely to report a symptom when the symptom is present. 
The conditional probability 
P{ReportiniiRash) I Rash} is 
Rash = present 
Report1nu(Rash) PQ = 0.95 
-,Report/nil Rash) 1- PQ = 0.05 
distribution 
Rash= absent 
PQ "]J; = 0.19 
Q 
p 
1- "]J;Q = 0.81 
Q 
3.2 REPORT ABILITY, REPORTING BIAS AND 
INFERENCE 
for 
As mentioned earlier, observing symptom Si renders the 
report node ReportQ(Si) independent of the rest of the 
belief network. Thus, only the likelihood ratio 
P{ -.ReportQ(S;) IS;= present} _ BQ( 1 - P Q) 
P{�eportQ(S;) IS;- absent} 
- BQ- P Q 
has an effect on inference, providing a default likelihood 
function for each unobserved symptom. We call this 
likelihood function, the relative likelihood of no report or 
A."Q( S;) . As the reportability, P Q• for Si approaches 1 
(meaning that present symptoms are always reported), 
A."Q( S;) tends to 0, implying that if symptom Si is not 
reported, it is almost certain that Si is absent. As the 
reportability for the symptom approaches 0, A."Q 
approaches 1; indicating that if there is only a low 
probability that si will be reported if present, we should 
not assume that Si is absent if there is no report. 
3.3 CUBITAL 1UNNEL EXAMPLE 
We tested the report node mechanism on the nerve 
compression disorder knowledge base (or CTS, after the 
most prominent disorder, carpal tunnel syndrome, in the 
KB). The CTS knowledge base was designed by a hand 
surgeon for evaluation of patients that were referred to his 
clinic with a preliminary diagnosis of a nerve compression 
injury affecting the hands or arms. Since the patients seen 
at this clinic have been referred by other doctors, the prior 
probabilities for many of the disorders are extremely large. 
For example, more than three-quarters of the patients in 
this clinic present with carpal tunnel syndrome. 
We were interested in modeling the patient's response to 
an initial complaint question, such as "What is bothering 
you?" The response to this question can include any or all 
of the symptoms2 in the knowledge base. 
We modeled the bias in the response to this question by 
adding a report node successor to each of the symptoms 
that might reported in response to this question. In order to 
simplify the assessment process, we assumed a single 
2 As seen in Figure 6, there are four classes of observations: signs (obser­
vations made by the doctor), symptoms (observations made by the 
patient), test results and predisposing factors. 
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Figure 6: Nerve CompressiOn Dtsorders of the Hand 
global value for the reporting bias, Batobat and the 
reportability, P Global , for all of the report nodes. 
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of the reporting mechanism 
on the differential diagnosis as a function of Baiobai. In this 
example, the reportability, Paiobai, is set to 0.9. We entered 
three of the symptoms of cubital tunnel syndrome, a 
disorder caused by compression of the ulnar nerve where it 
passes through the cubital fossa (the "funny bone"). The 
symptoms: 
1. Numbness or pain on both the volar (palm) and dorsal 
surfaces of the ulnar fingers (pinky and ring finger), 
2. Radiation of pain into both the dorsal and volar sur-
faces of the ulnar fingers, and 
3. Elbow pain with radiation of pain toward the hand. 
Figure 7 was prepared by recording the probabilities for 
cubital tunnel syndrome and the next four leading 
disorders as a function of Baiobai· If Baiobai is 1, the report 
nodes have no effect on the differential diagnosis. The 
probabilities for competing disorders are large because no 
symptoms have been observed that would rule these 
disorders out. In particular, note that carpal tunnel 
syndrome has nearly as high a probability as cubital tunnel 
syndrome, owing solely to its higher prior distribution. 
As we increase the reporting bias, the probabilities for 
competing disorders drop by over an order of magnitude. 
The rate that the competing disorders drop in probability is 
different for each disease; probabilities for disorders with 
many obvious, but unobserved, symptoms will tend to be 
decrease more than the probabilities of disorders with less 
obvious symptoms. If only a subset of the 'classic' 
symptoms of a disorder are entered, the primary diagnosis 
will also drop in probability, however the drop will tend to 
be less than that of disorders that have no positive findings. 
Q) U) 
:g U) 0 0.1 
0 
� 
:c 
� 0.01 
e 
a.. 
0.001 
2 4 8 16 32 
Bias 
-<>--Cubital Tunnel Syndrome 
-G- Carpal Tunnel Syndrome 
__._Peripheral Neuropathy 
-*-Guyon's Syndrome 
--)K- Thoracic Outlet Syndrome 
Figure 7: Differential diagnosis for the cubital tunnel 
syndrome case as a function of the global reporting bias 
Balobal· 
Note that increasing bias focuses the initial diagnosis on 
those disorders that are relevant to the reported symptoms. 
Increasing either the report bias or the reportability further 
focuses the differential diagnosis. 
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4 LEARNING ABOUT REPORT ABILITY 
In the next two sections, we will describe ways to relax the 
likelihood independence assumption. In Section 5, we will 
model the interaction between the report nodes for 
symptoms of differing severities. In this section, we relate 
the likelihoods for the report nodes through uncertain 
global reportability and reporting bias variables. 
The reporting preferences for individuals can be very 
different. For example, one patient might be more 
forthcoming about his symptoms, reporting the absence or 
presence of a multitude of symptoms. Another patient 
might be more reticent, reporting just a few abnormal 
symptoms. Can the reporting mechanism be applied to 
patients with widely varying reporting preferences? 
As long as the patient obeys the veridicality assumption 
(e.g. he doesn't lie or indulge in strategic (gaming) 
behavior) and the reportabilities and biases for symptoms 
change proportionally, the answer is yes. It is relatively 
straight forward to adapt the report node mechanism to 
permit learning of the bias and reportability parameters for 
a patient, either based on the results of a single interview 
or multiple interviews. 
The technique that we use is to condition the individual 
report nodes on chance nodes, PGtobat and BGtobat, 
representing the global reportability and reporting bias for 
the knowledge base (see the far right side of Fig. 6). The 
reportability and bias for the individual report nodes can 
be any increasing function of these global reportability and 
reporting bias parameters. In the CTS knowledge base, we 
assume that the reportability and reporting bias for each of 
report nodes is the same as the global reportability. 
When report nodes are instantiated, they update the 
densities for these global parameters. If a symptom is 
reported to be present or absent, the distribution over 
P Global is multiplied by the likelihood function 
A.( P Global) = P Global • If a symptom is not reported, the 
likelihood function used for updating PGtobat can't be 
factored from the rest of the network, but resembles a 
function of the form A.( P Global) = C- P Global where C ;::: 1 is 
a constant that depends on the probability that the 
symptom is actually absent and the value of the global 
bias. The likelihood functions for reportability roughly 
resemble those found in the conjugate beta distribution, 
however the distribution over reportability is not a 
conjugate distribution. 
The likelihood update for the bias parameter BGtobat is a 
strong function of whether the symptom is present or 
absent. If mostly present symptoms are observed, 
probability for higher biases will increase (as expected). If 
more absent symptoms are observed, the expectation of 
the reporting bias decreases. 
Figure 8 illustrates how the distribution over the global 
report bias and reportability changes with the number and 
type of observations in the CTS knowledge base. Since the 
reportability and bias variables cannot be represented 
using a conjugate distribution, we broke up the 
reportability and bias variables into a number of discrete 
values.3 We assigned an equal prior probability to each of 
these values in order to enhance the effect of the report 
node likelihood functions. Each column in the chart 
illustrates the posterior belief for reportability and 
reporting bias as a function of the number and type of 
observations. All of the report nodes are instantiated in 
each of the cases-the value for each report node is set to 
true if its associated symptom is observed and is false 
otherwise. 
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The far left column illustrates the belief in the reportability 
and report bias when no observations are entered in 
response to the initial complaint query. The expectation for 
the reportability is low (as expected). As more findings are 
observed, the expectation of reportability increases, 
regardless of whether the symptom reported is present or 
absent. Reportability, then, is primarily a function of the 
number of symptoms observed. 
The reporting bias, on the other hand, is a strong function 
of whether the individual reports are present or absent. The 
middle columns of the figure illustrate how the expectation 
for the bias increases as more and more present symptoms 
are reported. The single report of absent (far right column) 
lowers the expectation of the bias. 
5 REPORTING AND SEVERITY 
In this section, we will consider the interaction between 
reports for symptoms of differing severities. If one 
symptom is perceived to be more severe than another, we 
3 An alternative approach might be to use an optimization routine to iden­
tify the setting for P Global and Bctobal that maximizes the probability of 
evidence for the entire network. 
might expect that the reportability for the first symptom is 
greater than that of the second. Furthermore, if a patient 
reports a number of mild symptoms at the start of an 
interview, we might conclude that it is extremely unlikely 
that a more severe symptom is present. In this section, we 
present a simple model that captures both of these kinds of 
inferences. 
Throughout this section, we will consider only two classes 
of symptoms: major symptoms {S�, ... , s:} and minor 
symptoms {Si, ... , s;;}. Two uncertain global parameters, 
P Major and P Minor , will be used to model the reportabilities 
for major and minor symptoms, respectively. 
One possible belief network architecture that we might 
choose is to condition the reportability of the minor 
symptoms P Minor on a the presence of (possibly 
unreported) major symptoms. For example, we can 
reducing the minor symptom reportability whenever the 
boolean expression (S� =present) v ... v cs: =present) is 
true. 
Minor Symptoms Major Symptoms 
Figure 9: Reporting model for symptoms of differing 
severities. 
We propose an alternative technique (Figure 9). The 
reportability for the major symptoms, P Major , is a function 
h( P Minor) of the reportability for the minor symptoms. This 
function satisfies the following properties. 
1. Increasing reportability: h is strictly increasing on 
(0, 1). That is h(PMinor) > PMinor when PMinor E (0, 1). 
2. Probability: 't:f(PMinorE [0, 1]),h(PMinor)E [0, 1] 
3. Decreasing odds ratio: h(PMinor)l PMinor is decreasing. 
It is easy to identify functions that satisfy these conditions. 
One such function is h(x) = 2x -x2• 
Increasing reponability ensures that the reportability of 
major symptoms is larger than the reportability of minor 
symptoms. Decreasing odds ratio guarantees the 
following: The change in expectation of reportability 
increases more when a minor symptom is reported to be 
present than if a major symptom is reported to be present. 
If this property is true, a report of a minor symptom will 
greatly increase the relative likelihood of no report for a 
major symptom, but the report of a major symptom will 
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have a smaller effect on A.Q . This means that if one or 
more minor symptoms is reported to be present and no 
major symptoms have been reported, then it is plausible to 
believe that no major symptoms are present. The converse 
is not true to the same degree. 
For example, suppose that the prior probabilities for the 
disorders in Figure 9 are both 0.01. Rash and Chest Pain 
are both perfect observations-each symptom is present if 
and only if the corresponding disease is present. The prior 
distribution of PMinor is a uniform distribution and 
p Major = 2P Minor- p�inor. If we observe rash to be present 
and chest pain is unreported, the probability of heart 
attack drops from a prior value of 0.0 1 to 0.00 18. On the 
other hand, if we observe chest pain to be present and rash 
is unreported, the probability of rash drops from a prior of 
0.0 1 to 0.004-a much smaller drop. 
6 RELATEDWORK 
Our research on reportability seems strongly related to 
linguistics research on conversational implicature. 
Conversational implicature is based on the observation 
[Grice, 1975] that the participants in a conversation 
generally and cooperatively adhere to a set of conventions 
for generating contributions to that conversation. This 
cooperative principle allows the listener to infer more 
from a conversation than is literally expressed. Say that a 
speaker remarks "I have three children." This statement is 
literally true if the speaker has three, four, or twelve 
children. It is usually assumed, however, that if the 
speaker could have made a stronger claim ("I have twelve 
children."), he would have. 
Grice's Maxims of Conversation [ 1967] represent an 
attempt (the most influential) to capture the conventions 
that govern the generation and interpretation of utterances 
in a conversation. Two of these maxims are relevant to the 
research reported in this paper, the Maxim of Quality and 
the Maxim of Quantity. 
The Maxim of Quality says that a speaker should not say 
what he knows to be false and should not make any claims 
for which he lacks evidence. Veridicality (Section 3) is the 
assumption that the user of a diagnostic system will adhere 
to the Maxim of Quality. 
Grice's Maxim of Quantity states that the speaker should 
make the strongest statement supported by the evidence 
available to him and not make a statement that is stronger. 
One classic example of this is the statement "Some of the 
apples are ripe." The Maxim of Quantity allows us to 
conclude from this statement that some of the apples are 
not ripe, because if all of the apples were ripe, the speaker 
would have said so. Our scheme for the interpretation of 
open probe questions relies on two quantity implicatures: 
1. the assumption that a patient will report symptoms 
that are present more readily than symptoms that are 
absent, and 
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2. the assumpton that a speaker will tend to report more 
severe symptoms before those that are less severe. 
This second implicature appears to be a kind of scalar 
implicature [Levinson, 83]. An implicational scale is a set 
of expressions of the same grammatical category that are 
linearly ordered in terms of their informativeness. For 
example, {all, many, some} constitute an implicational 
scale from the more informative "all" to the less 
informative "some." Now consider the statements "All of 
the apples are ripe," "Many of the apples are ripe," and 
"Some of the apples are ripe." Sentences using more 
informative terms from an implicational scale tend to 
imply that weaker statements are true. For example, 
"Many of the apples are ripe" implies that "Some of the 
apples are ripe." Sentences using less informative 
statements tend to imply that stronger statements are false. 
For example, "Many of the apples are ripe" implies that 
the stronger statement "All of the apples are ripe" is false. 
In our work, symptoms of varying perceived severities 
appear to form a partial order similar to an implicational 
scale. A solitary report of a less severe symptom implies 
that a more severe symptom is absent. A solitary report of 
a severe symptom, on the other hand, does not seem to 
imply the absence of a lesser symptom quite as strongly. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented a simple technique for capturing two 
kinds of reporting preferences for answers to open probe 
questions: The first is a preference for reporting present 
symptoms over absent symptoms. The second is a 
preference for reporting more severe symptoms before 
those that are less severe. These two techniques allow us to 
use the answers to open probes to infer not only the values 
for reported symptoms, but also to infer likelihood 
functions for unobserved symptoms. The likelihoods 
resulting from these unobserved symptoms has the effect 
of focussing the differential diagnosis, resulting in more 
focussed question asking. The technique is easy to apply, 
seems effective, and corrects a potentially serious source 
of bias in probabilistic expert systems. 
It seems plausible that we might improve our model of 
open probe questions by exploiting contemporary research 
in linguistics. There is a question, though, about whether 
this is worth it. The primary effect of changing the open 
probe model is to change the observation order in the 
sequence of closed probe question-asking following the 
initial open probe. The final diagnosis may not be a strong 
function of the observation order. None-the-less, this 
seems to be a fruitful area for further experimentation and 
analysis. 
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